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Abstract
This paper examines the determinants of recent antidumping decisions administered by the
International Trade Commission and the Department of Commerce in the United States and
the European Commission in Europe. We use case-specific data for the US and the EU, and
political pressure data to investigate the macroeconomic and industry-level determinants of
decision given by the antidumping authority. We estimate a Probit model to analyze the
decisions of the authorities. Besides the economic factors, we find evidence of the existence
of political influence as a motive for implementation antidumping measures.
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There is a long-standing and extensive economics literature on antidumping. The theoretical 
work has focused on explaining, among other aspects, the antidumping strategies of 
competing firms and the interplay among firms and governments administering antidumping 
procedures. There is also a wide-ranging empirical literature on the impact of antidumping 
procedures.
1 The analysis provided in this paper contributes to a different branch of the 
antidumping literature which investigates the determinants of antidumping case outcomes. 
Studies on the US and EU have focused almost exclusively on the original antidumping 
decisions, with particular attention to the International Trade Commission’s (ITC) and 
European Commission’s (EC) material injury decisions. Starting with Finger et al. (1982), 
economists have empirically examined the political and economic determinants of U.S. 
antidumping decisions. Other recent works along these lines include Moore (1992), De Vault 
(1993) and Hansen and Prusa (1997). For the EU, this issue has been studied by Tharakan 
(1991) and Eymann and Schuknecht (1996). While results have varied somewhat from study 
to study, the basic conclusion is that decisions can be explained by the protection of rents to 
labour and capital, along with some – but generally not a dominant -- role for political 
influence. Feinberg (2005), after considering the filing decision, examines 473 U.S. 
antidumping cases filed between 1981 and 1998 and explains the determinants of a 
favourable outcome for petitioners, finding both macroeconomic and steel industry effects. 
The main difficulty in this type of analysis is collecting the data at a very disaggregated level 
of classification (6 standard digit).   
Our analysis aims at testing one major proposition: that the determinants of decisions taken 
by antidumping authorities are both political and economic. The paper is structured as 
follows: first, we specify a Probit model to analyze the decision from the EU and US; and, 
second, we analyze our results before finally concluding. 
  
2.  Model and data 
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Where, for i=1,2… n,  is the observed dichotomous variable representing the 
decision of the agency (a value of 1 corresponding to a favorable decision), and   is a latent 
variable which may be interpreted as the propensity of the agency to respond in favour of the 
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the matrix of the explanatory variables, β is a vector of unknown parameters and i µ  is a 
random term error. The database comprises the decisions (DECISION) given by the EC in 
Europe and the ITC and the Department of Commerce (DOC) in the US
2. In our analysis, we 









                                                 
1 For a comprehensive review of theoretical and empirical work on antidumping, see Blonigen and Prusa (2001), 
Sadni Jallab Mustapha, Monnet Patrick Bakou, Sandretto René, (2006). 
 
2 Our data does not include pending cases, see appendix 1. 
  1Economic variables
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We took into consideration the number of times that the product was incriminated during the 
period (PRODUCT-PERIOD) and the average MFN tariff collected on the product (TARIFF). 
We have included tariff in a non-linear fashion in order to understand the dynamic of the 
tariff function compared to the opening of antidumping procedures. Indeed, our intuition is 
that an optimal tariff, which could activate antidumping measure, may exist. This optimal 
tariff is discussed more deeply below. An overdrawn trade balance could increase 
protectionist tensions and therefore incite the authorities to pronounce positive decisions 
(TRADE-BALANCE). If the target country has a competition policy, the probability of having 
a positive decision is weaker. We suppose here that the risk of retaliation is less important 
when the targeted country does not have a competition policy than the contrary 
(COMPETITION), (Blonigen and Bown, 2003). As noted by Blonigen and Prusa (2003), an 
important research question is why there are not more antidumping petitions, given the 
relative ease with which domestic industries can obtain antidumping protection and the 
possibilities for collusive outcomes even if petitions do not bring formal antidumping 
protection. U.S. antidumping petitions often involve very specific and narrowly-defined 
products and annual activity often involves a very small portion (less than 5%) of even 
manufacturing activity. The threat of retaliation may be one important answer to this research 
question. The examination of the antidumping example allows us to illustrate the interaction 
between trade and competition policies. Applying antidumping rules creates conflicts due to 
the fact that these rules could be part of competition policies focusing on the promotion of 
competition by (e.g.) the sanction of predatory price discriminations. So far, antidumping 
activities have been covered within the framework of international trade policy.
 However, 
this situation does not create the conditions for a first-best solution. Thus, the phenomenon of 
antidumping shows both the strategic dimension of competition policies and 
interdependences and deficiencies resulting from the existence of both policies at the 
international level. Furthermore, competition policy is based on the principles of non-
discrimination, protection, equal opportunities, individual rights and consumer interest. Thus, 
it seems to be more equitable than trade policy due to the fact that the latter is based on the 
principle of non-discrimination that nevertheless applies only to producers (Petersmann, E.-
U.,1994;UNCTAD 1999). We also integrated two other economic variables: one which 
captures the labour market (LUNEMPLOY), assuming that the more employees there are in 
the considered industries, the more this industry will be seen as strategic and thus, the more 
the authorities will be sensitive to their demands for protection; and, the other which is the 
import penetration rate (LRIMP). These two variables should be positively correlated to the 




To capture the influence of political factors, we integrated the number of times that a country 
was incriminated during the studied period (COUNTRY-PERIOD). This information could act 
as a proxy for the level of harassment that a country may face. The level of development of a 
given country was also captured in our estimations. Indeed, we introduced dichotomous 
variables concerning the target countries. A dichotomous variable was assigned the value 1 if 
the country of origin of the exporting firm was a developing country and the value 0 in the 
opposite case (LDC), and another dichotomous variable taking the value 1 if the country of 
                                                 
3 The data are detailed in appendix 1. All value variables are measured in real terms, and where appropriate, the 
explanatory variables are included as proportional changes. We used the GDP deflator, built from the GDP 
series in current prices and GDP in volume at 1997 prices. 
  2origin of the exporting firm was a newly industrialized country and the value 0 in the 
opposite case (NIC). Another variable was also introduced that indicates the number of 
complaints made against the same product having ended in an antidumping defense 
accumulated during the period (PRODUCT-PERIOD). In addition to these variables, we also 
considered two other “political” dummies indicating a target country, China, which is of 
particular concern to the domestic interests of both the U.S. and E.U., and an industry sector, 
Steel, which is generally viewed as possessing political clout in both economies (respectively 
Dummy-China and Dummy-Steel). The decisions of the national antidumping authorities were 
captured by a dichotomous variable: the value 1 was given in cases in which the national 
authority implements a defense; and, the value 0 was given where the procedure was closed 
without a defense being implemented. 
 
3.  The role of political factors in the implementation of antidumping measures 
 
More recent research has emphasized the primary importance of economic rather than 
political criteria. For example, Herander and Schwartz (1984), Baldwin (1985) and Anderson 
(1993) all find that politics have little to do with ITC decisions. However, as Hansen and 
Prusa (1997) mentioned, these results need to be revisited and the choice of political variable 
reconsidered. The COUNTRY-PERIOD and COMPETITION variables are used here 
specifically as a proxy for the level of harassment that a country may face and the risk that 
retaliations occurred respectively. The PRODUCT-PERIOD variable describes the situation 
where two or more almost identical products, originating in the same country, are subjected to 
the scrutiny of contingent protection in several countries. Our inquiry will thus attempt to 
explain why in two or more countries, where producers are not necessarily the same or 
directly competing against each other but where ‘similar’ products are produced, ‘similar’ 
measures come to be taken against ‘similar’ importing competition. In particular, we focus on 
the case of antidumping investigations aimed at protecting domestic manufacturers. By 
simultaneously incorporating the economic and political factors, we find evidence of both 
factors in the decision’s motivations. The model predicts the endogenous variable in 76.5 % 
of European cases and 87 % for American cases (Table 1). 
 
We show that the relationship between average tariffs and a positive decision seems to be U-
shaped (see Figures 1 and 2), with both very low and very high tariff sectors having a higher 
probability of a positive antidumping decision. One may expect that low tariff sector 
industries would be judged to be in greater “need” of protection. The analysis of tariffs in a 
perfectly competitive market demonstrates that when a large country imposes a relatively 
small tariff, or if it imposes an optimal tariff, then domestic national welfare will rise, but 
foreign national welfare falls. The partial equilibrium analysis shows further that national 
welfare losses to the exporting nation exceed the national welfare gains to the importing 
nation. The reason is that any tariff set by a large country also reduces world welfare. If we 
assume that nations are concerned about the national welfare effects of trade policies, then 
the tariff analysis provides a rationale for antidumping initiations on the part of large 
importing nations. However, if large importing nations like US or EU set optimal tariffs on 
all or many of their imported goods, the effect internationally will be to reduce national 
welfare of its trading partners. If the trade partners are also concerned about their own 
national welfare, then they would likely find the optimal tariffs objectionable and would look 
for ways to mitigate the negative effects. One effective way to mitigate the loss in national 
welfare, if the trade partners are also large countries, is to retaliate with optimal tariffs on 
your own imported goods. The results concerning the TARIFF variable in the US are similar 
to the EU results; the relationship is U-shaped with both very high and very low tariff rates 
  3leading to a greater likelihood that the authorities will make a positive decision. The more the 
tariff is raised on a particular sector, the more the product is deemed to be "sensitive" and the 
more the antidumping duty will be raised. Therefore, politically strong sectors will be 
protected by both antidumping and tariffs. 
 
The sectoral import penetration rate variable (LRIMP) must be considered for at least three 
reasons; firstly, an increase in the rate of import penetration means (or can be perceived to 
mean) more rigorous foreign competition. Secondly, the proof of material injury requires 
evidence that the industry has experienced a sharp increase in imports. Thirdly, the WTO 
antidumping code reinforces the obligation for the reporting country to establish a causal 
relationship between the dumped imports and the damage suffered by the complainant 
industry. When we look at the sectoral import penetration rate in the explanation of these 
decisions, it appears to be a very significant factor in both the EU and the US. The sectoral 
import penetration rate variable is a good proxy for injury experienced by domestic firms, 
which is a fundamental determinant of the decisions taken by the authorities. Indeed, the 
higher the import penetration rate, the greater the likelihood of a positive decision.  
 
We find that the sectoral unemployment rate (LUNEMPLOY) also increases the probability of 
a positive decision, but only in the EU. Indeed, the larger the sectoral employment rate, 
greater the likelihood there is to be a positive decision. However, concerning the US, the 
larger the sectoral unemployment rate, the less the likelihood there is to be a positive 
decision. This apparently counter-intuitive result was earlier found by DeVault (1993), who 
interprets it as suggesting that an industry with many employees is a strong industry, which 
does not need to be defended by antidumping measures. More intuitively, we find that the 
greater the total trade balance (TRADE-BALANCE) is with the target country, the more likely 
the decision will be positive. Surprisingly, if the target country is a newly industrialized 
country, the less likely it is the decision given by the authorities will be positive. This may 
reflect the lessened concern over the threat that exporters from these countries pose to 
domestic interests. 
 
Our estimation reveals that the more a targeted country is the object of inquiries in the period, 
the greater the probability that the decisions taken by the national authorities will be positive. 
This result demonstrates the role of political factors, as noted by DeVault (1993)
4. Our 
estimation also highlights the fact that if the target country has a well-established competition 
policy (COMPETITION), the regulator has less incentive to make a positive decision, which 
could be interpreted as a political influence. We find strong positive effects in cases involving 
China and the Steel sector, suggesting non-economic factors may play a role in these cases. 
This relationship confirms the American and European practice, which consists of defending 
the sectors that would otherwise be a victim of unfair trade. (Finger and Murray, 1990)  
 
We were interested in the direct channel by revealing the interaction which exists between the 
lobbies and the reglementary authority. The variable ‘PRODUCT-PERIOD’ is an important 
political factor in explaining these decisions. Indeed, the number of complaints made against 
the same product having ended in an antidumping defense accumulated during the period is 
also very significant and a frequently targeted product has a higher probability of having 
antidumping duties implemented on each occasion. We also found evidence of political 
dimension, both in EU and US in the decision making process in the sense that the 
                                                 
4 However, we also find that the more a product is the object of inquiries over the period the less likely it is that 
a decision will be positive
 , which is contrary to our expectations. 
  4COUNTRY-PERIOD variable is significant and illustrates the fact that AD authority may be 
influenced by the number of times a country is incriminated. Therefore, there is a clear risk 
that political pressure through political channels can lead bureaucrats to impose antidumping 
duties to protect politically powerful industries with little economic evidence of injury.   
 
Table 1: Dependant variable: Regulatory Agency decisions in United States and European Union 
 
Dependant variable: Regulatory Agency decision 
1998-2002 
Explanatory variables 
United States  European Union 
Number of Observation  259  285 
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Besides the economic factors, we find evidence of the existence of political influence and that 
of indirect capture. Indeed, we find that political pressure, measured by the number of 
antidumping cases involving the product for the period and the number of antidumping cases 
involving the country in the period, as well as the “political” dummy, China, and an industry 
sector, Steel, which is generally viewed as possessing political clout in both economies, has 
an important influence on ITC-DOC and EC decisions. These variables appear to be 
positively and significantly related to an industry’s prospects for protection. One reform that 
might be considered would be to only sanction, in the form of antidumping measures, cases 
of dumping which lead to a threat of monopolization of the market. Taking into account the 
factors of world competition and the WTO definition of dumping would likely be found to 
have major responsibility for the current intensification of the use of this form of 
administered trade protection. 
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  6Appendix 1: Description of the variables used for the estimations
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Variable Characteristics  Tested  hypothesis  Source 
DECISION  Dichotomous variable 
identifying the 
decision: 1 if the 
Authority takes a 
positive decision; 0 if 
not. 
  Annual and semiannual 
reports of the European 
Commission to the European 
Parliament on antidumping 
activities. 
Annual and semiannual 
reports of the USDOC and 
USITC on antidumping 
activities
6. 
Number of antidumping cases 
involving the product for the 
period 1998-2002 
PROD-PERIOD 
Numeric variable at 
the product level  
The more a product is a target 
of inquiries for the period, the 
more the authorities will tend to 
give a positive decision. 
Annual reports of the 
European and American 
authorities. Notifications 
deposited in the Secretariat of 
the WTO, (document quoted 
G/AD/N/year/ EEC
7
Bureau of Census, ITC, 
DOC). 
Average MFN Tariff 
(calculations of the WTO 
Secretariat HS Classification)  
TARIFF 
Average tariff in 
percentage (product 
level, HS 6) 
Decisions tend to be positive 
when the tariff is above a 
threshold. 
Calculations made by the 
WTO Secretariat; DG Trade, 
Electronic database TARIC; 
and, Tariff Schedule of the 
United States, USITC. 
Number of antidumping cases 
involving the country in the 
period 
COUNTRY-PERIOD 
Numeric variable   The more a country is a target 
of inquiries in the period, the 
more the authorities will tend to 
give a positive decision. 
Calculations of the authors 
from the various reports of 
the European Commission. 
Annual reports of the 
American authorities 
DUMMY-CHINA   Political  influence   
DUMMY-STEAL   Political  influence   




taking the value 1 
where this is positive 
and 0 where it is not, 
(economy-wide) 
If the target country has a 
competition policy, the 
probability of having a positive 
decision is weaker. Risk of 
retaliations. 




Numeric variable at 
the industry level 
This variable must be positively 
correlated to the decision taken 
by the regulatory authority. 
Eurostat, OLISNET 
(OECD.), Handbook of 
International Trade 
Annual Survey of 
Manufactures, Bureau of 
Census. 
Import penetration rate 
LRIMP =Log RIMP 
 
Numeric variable at 
the industry level 
This variable must be positively 
correlated to the decision taken 
by the regulatory authority. 
Eurostat, OLISNET 
(OECD.), Handbook of 
International Trade 
OLISNET (OCDE.), USITC, 
Trade Data Base. 
Total trade balance 
TRADE-BALANCE 
Total exports less total 
imports. 
An overdrawn trade balance 
increases protectionist tensions 
and can incite the authorities to 
pronounce positive decisions. 
European Commission, DG 
Trade  
U.S. Bureau of Census
8. 
NIC- LDC 
New industrialized and less 
developed countries.  
Dichotomous variable 
taking the value 1 in 
the positive case, 0 in 
the negative case. 
Does the level of development 
of the target countries influence 
the decisions? 
The annual and semiannual 
reports of the United States 
on the antidumping 
activities.. WTO notifications 
G/AD/N/(year)/USA 
 
                                                 
5 All the Data are available upon request. 
6 See, http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm for the EC, www.commerce.gov for the DOC and www.usitc.gov for 
the ITC.
7 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm  
8 http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/index.html  
  7Figure 1: Relation between Tariff (t ) and the probability to have a positive decision (d) in E.U. 
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Figure 2: Relation between Tariff and the probability to have a positive decision in U.S. 
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9 Indeed,  ()
2 11.674 97.632 f dd Χ= − + + C  where C represents the other estimated coefficients. If we 
optimize () / f d Χ , we get d =5.97%. 
10 Indeed,  ()
2 5,96 31,8 f dd Χ= − + + C  where C represents the other estimated coefficients. If we 
optimize () / f d Χ , we get  9,37% d = . 
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